therefore context independent. Constructionism deals with objects that are established by our practices. Social constructionists make specific and local claims, which are context dependent. The science of design emphasizes the building metaphor of assembling parts, the systematic arrangements of elements, which become part of a whole (Hacking, 1999) .
The science of design aims at creating parts in such a way that the resulting whole operates in a desired way. The outcome of design is artificial; it is made by the art and craft of human beings and would not have existed naturally. This applies in particular to gaming as a rapidly evolving field of research and practice.
Games take a dual position. They can be used both to develop and test theories, which is an analytical science objective, and to change existing situations into preferred ones, which is a design science purpose (Klabbers, 2003b) . Both roads require different and, to some extent, mutually exclusive methodologies. In the following, I will elaborate on these and related questions.
Design sciences: Communities of practice
Design scientists produce and apply local knowledge for unique circumstances to create effective artifacts. Design science is made up of constructing artifacts for special purposes and for assessing their effect under the well-defined circumstances of use. Design science is also a craft and an art. A basic question that needs to be addressed is, How well does the artifact perform, considering the specifications for the design, including the goals to be achieved? Contrary to the theory-driven approach of the analytical science, design science is issue driven. It addresses human needs, conquers bottlenecks, and capitalizes on opportunities. Research activities of design science include developing and assessing (meta)artifacts, models, methods, processes, and procedures.
Professional communities of practice have gained high esteem in society, although they usually have a lower position on the academic ladder. They address questions that fit into the realm of postnormal science. Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993) use the term postnormal science for issue-driven research in a context of hard political pressure, values in dispute, high decision stakes, and high epistemological and ethical systems uncertainties. They use the term postnormal to indicate that the puzzlesolving exercises of normal science (that is, analytical science in the rationalist [Kuhnian] sense) are no longer appropriate when society is confronted with the need to resolve policy issues concerning tricky local, national, transnational, and transgenerational social issues (Klabbers, 2004a) .
Design sciences propagate that everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones. I have distinguished between two levels of design: design-in-the-small (DIS), referring to simulation game design as such, and design-in-the-large (DIL), referring to changing existing situations into preferred ones (Klabbers, 2003b) . Both levels of design are closely interconnected. Simon (1969) argues that everyone who devises courses of action that are aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones acts as a designer. The intellectual activity that produces material artifacts is not fundamentally different from the one that prescribes remedies for the sick patient or the one that devises a new sales plan for a company or a social welfare policy for a state. Design, interpreted in such a way, is the core of all inquiry that creates artifacts that serve human purposes. It is also an approach that is used in professional training. It is the principal mark that distinguishes the design science from the analytical sciences. Schools of (social) engineering, as well as schools of architecture, management and business, education, law, and medicine, are all centrally concerned with the design style of reasoning.
Gaming centers on the design, deployment, and use of artifacts that represent tangible solutions to real-world problems. It has much in common with engineering, architecture, and other fields of design such as information (systems) science. March and Smith (1995) argue that whereas natural science tries to understand reality, design science attempts to create artifacts that serve human purposes to change reality. These artifacts are assessed against criteria of value or utility for the user/client. Does it work? Does it provide an improvement?
Design is a key activity in fields such as architecture, engineering, urban planning, and gaming. March and Smith (1995) observe that rather than producing general theoretical knowledge, design scientists produce and apply knowledge of tasks or situations to create effective artifacts (p. 253). They distinguish four types of products (see Table 1 ):
• constructs-a basic (formal) language of concepts, also viewed as meta-artifacts;
• models-higher order constructions;
• methods-ways of performing goal-directed activities;
• implementations-instantiations intended to perform certain tasks.
A significant difficulty in design sciences results from the fact that the performance of the artifacts is related to the environment in which they operate. March and Smith note that incomplete understanding of that environment can result in inappropriately designed artifacts or artifacts that result in undesirable side effects. Evaluation is complicated by the fact that performance is related to intended use, which can cover a range of tasks. Not only must an artifact be evaluated, the evaluation criteria themselves must be negotiated among various stakeholders (actors) for the artifact in a particular context of use. Progress is achieved in design sciences when more effective artifacts and procedures replace existing ones.
If the artifact is a new product such as a mobile phone, a car, or an airplane, then the evaluation criteria are well-defined as compared with the more intangible evaluation criteria of a game. To address this question from the perspective of game design, it is worthwhile to make a distinction between the design as such of the artifact and its potential effect on its operating environment. That environment is a social system with all its peculiar characteristics. Implementing games in social systems to raise the level of awareness, to practice skills, and to produce knowledge are interventions to enhance change.
To be able to distinguish between the broad scope of the term design as pointed out by Simon, and the more limited instrumental perspective of game design as implied by March and Smith, I have made the distinction between DIL and DIS (Klabbers, 2003b) . DIS refers to the design of simulation games as artifacts, whereas DIL deals with the effect of those artifacts on changing existing situations into preferred ones. Simulation games-as artifacts-are designed with explicit goals in mind. The goals of such goals-the metagoals-refer to the objective of the DIL. The related approach represents the macro-cycle of policy-or action-oriented research (Klabbers, 2004a) .
Analytical sciences: Communities of observers
As mentioned earlier, the laboratory style is the driving force of scientific discovery in physics, chemistry, and biology. It stresses instrumental reasoning with the explicit view that nature can be explained and eventually controlled. In laboratories, certain phenomena can be isolated and purified, especially phenomena in chemistry and physics. In biology, it is less straightforward to isolate and purify them without destroying some basic features. Isolating a cell from an organism to study its anatomy will kill it. Isolating and purifying phenomena in a laboratory is part of the analytical approach of science.
The laboratory style of reasoning is also applied to social reality, for example, by designing experiments to test theories in the behavioral and social sciences. Against this background, gaming and simulation provide appropriate methods for conducting a laboratory style of inquiry in individual and social behavior, using the hypotheticdeductive method. Such an analytical approach conveys a positivist and rationalist view on human affairs. However, we should realize that from the viewpoint of systems theory, understanding the properties of the parts is insufficient to understand the properties of the whole. The properties of water cannot be derived from analyzing the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. The properties of a cell cannot be gathered from the properties of its components. The properties of an individual human being cannot be derived from the properties of the various parts of the body. The properties of a collective social network cannot be inferred from the properties of its individual members. In such cases, the laboratory style of reasoning meets its boundaries.
The laboratory style of inquiry, and the related research in physical, biological, sociological, anthropological, psychological, and economic knowledge domains, is a valuable but insufficient condition for understanding the world we live in. It aims at discovery and justification-claims for validity-through developing and testing of theories. How discoveries happen is not well understood. Testing theories, however, is basic to the laboratory style of reasoning. It represents the scientific research method. Those involved in the related analytical science view themselves as observers, independent of and neutral to the objects of inquiry. They eventually may see themselves as referees to judge the world from their observatories. When they group themselves to study certain knowledge domains such as in disciplines, they base themselves on distinct styles of reasoning. As a consequence, the various disciplines form different and separate communities of observers. The communities of observers from disciplines such as psychology, sociology, international relations, economics, biology, chemistry, and physics are operationally closed, as they obey different and sometimes mutually exclusive rules of inference. Therefore, communication between those separate knowledge domains is not flourishing. Those who apply the laboratory style of reasoning enjoy a high status in academia. They pursue paradigms of the so-called normal sciences (Kuhn, 1962 ).
Natural science model of analytical science
The scientific method of natural science is based on experimental and empirical research, which produces and validates explicit knowledge. Rigid rules are necessary to isolate and protect phenomena from flawed analysis. Table 2 illustrates the inquiry scheme of analytical science. Researchers accept the following methodological features of inquiry:
• researcher objectivity and distance;
• environmental control of independent variables; • hypothetic-deductive reasoning;
• prediction.
Within the scheme of Table 2 , gaming fits into "models," "minitheories," as well as "methods/techniques." As minitheory, games and simulations encompass objects and relationships; as methods, they are tools to test theories. This dual position is expressed in the following observation (Klabbers, 2001 ):
Game scientists have theoretical models, and speculative conjectures couched in terms of those models. They also have views about how gaming works and what you can do with it; how games can be designed, modified, adapted. Typically, the game does not behave as expected. The world resists. Scientists have to accommodate themselves to that resistance. They can do it by correcting the major theory under investigation, they can revise beliefs about how the game works and they can modify the game itself. The end result is a robust fit between all these elements. (p. 473) This mixing of games as minitheories and research methods (tools) may hamper a clear distinction between treatment, moderating, and dependent variables while conducting an experiment.
The scientific method in the analytical science tradition Chatterji (2005) summarizes the core ideas underlying the scientific method, as follows. The simplest experiment involves a 2 × 2 research design: two variables (the independent [treatment] and dependent [expected outcome] variables) and two groups. One group is randomly assigned to the treatment condition, whereas the other (the control group) receives no treatment (an alternate or placebo). This design is recommended as one of the better research designs for addressing questions about cause and effect, because it upholds the principle of control, randomization, and comparison (Campbell & Stanley, 1963; Chatterji, 2005; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002; Spector, 1981) . Chatterji lists a number of variations to this basic experimental design: multiple group, longitudinal designs, or split plot designs. When randomization is problematic, quasi-experimental designs are considered the next best option for addressing cause-effect questions (Chatterji, 2005; Shadish et al., 2002) . Examples are matched group comparisons, interrupted time series designs, and regression discontinuity methods. The various experimental designs offer trade-offs among the principles of control, randomization, and comparison. The core question of the textbook-style laboratory experiment concerns dealing with the following tensions (Chatterji, 2005) :
To different degrees, such trade-offs threaten internal validity of the experiment, preventing conclusive causal linkages to be made between the treatment and outcome variables, or to the external validity (generalizability) of the findings. Highly controlled experiments reduce external validity because they create unrealistic laboratory-like conditions that cannot be replicated in actual settings where an intervention is eventually implemented. More loose controls, on the other hand, diminish internal validity, permitting inferences only about the "gross effects" of the intervention rather than its "net effects" (Rossie, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999). (p. 16) Dealing with those tensions means acting on practical constraints such as available time, financial and other resources, and participants. Documented threats to textbook-style experiments are as follows: participant selection biases, different history of participants, problems with outcome measures (poor validity, reliability, or instrument reactivity), participant attrition, nonrepresentative samples, and poor operationalization of variables or lack of treatment fidelity in the experiment (Chatterji, 2005) .
Basically, textbook-style experiments pursue the inference scheme of the Trivial Machine (TM; von Foerster, 1984) . He defines a machine as a conceptual device with well-defined rules of operation. The TM is defined as a black box F processing input x to output y (see Figure 1) .
The inference scheme, that is, the invariable relationship F between x and y provided by TMs, is widely used in science. The list of terms in Table 3 illustrates this point.
As soon as the x-y correspondence through F is established, any x will generate a specific y, independent of time. As a consequence, TMs are predictable, history independent, synthetically deterministic (definition of x-y correspondence), and analytically determinable. On the conceptual level, this inference scheme represents philosophical determinism. On the level of instrumental reasoning, it presents a linearmechanistic kind of causality, even when attributing to the input and output variable probability distributions, which is common research practice in the social and human sciences. The underlying view conveys a world made up of connected TMs-based on linear mechanistic causality. The methodological features of inquiry are as follows:
• researcher objectivity and distance by an impartial and passive observer;
• environmental control of independent variables; • control of all moderator variables; • hypothetic-deductive reasoning;
• statistical reasoning; and • prediction. As mentioned above, the related rigid rules of inquiry are necessary to isolate and protect phenomena from flawed analysis. The principle of control, randomization, and comparison is a precondition for establishing valid cause-effect relations between treatment and outcome. All processes in between treatment (cause) and outcome (effect) are captured in a so-called black box. This approach is only adequate for textbook-style laboratory experiments. If the three conditions for various practical reasons cannot be met, meaning that researchers are not in control of the experimental setting through isolating the discretely defined variables, ensuring that everything else will remain unchanged, they try to justify their lack of robust outcomes by arguing why they could not meet the standards of the scientific method, represented through TMs. However, they should question the basic flaws in their thinking about the research methodology.
Beyond the confines of a laboratory experiment, the preconditions of control, randomization, and comparison usually are not met for very good reasons. In field studies, to evaluate governmental programs, policy initiatives, or DIL projects, to assess the effect of artifacts such as games and simulations, we have to look for a more adequate methodology that justifies that we are dealing with complex dynamic systems. In those systems with emergent properties, the internal structure and processes do matter. We need to open the black box to understand what works under which conditions, because actors intervene and construct knowledge suitable to their needs. Next, I will offer a frame of reference more tuned to the requirements for such research, more particular, to artifact assessment.
Design science methodology for artifact assessment
Above, I have argued that when the principle of control, randomization, and comparison is violated, researchers should abandon the narrowly positivist approach in search for simple, linear, and mechanistic causality. They should open their minds for more adequate inference schemes. The TM is, within analytical science research, the most obvious and predominant inference scheme for establishing chains of causal relations. The internal characteristics of the black box do not matter or are ignored, and it is assumed that they do not interfere with the verisimilitude of the treatment-outcome causality. By presenting the inference scheme of the Non-Trivial Machine (NTM), von Foerster (1984) , however, has argued that the internal structure and processes of the black box do matter (see Figure 2) . We have come to realize that many phenomena cannot be investigated fruitfully via the construct of TM (Klabbers, 1996) . For many phenomena, it is impossible to establish a valid transfer function F. In many cases in which the TM can only offer approximations to complex dynamic systems, such as in econometric, sociometric, and psychometric research, the error component for variance not explained by the x-y correspondence is generally too high to generate valid, reliable, sustainable, and crosscontexts results. A second argument suggesting that the TM as a construct is too narrow is based on the reference scheme of the NTM. The NTM is a more powerful construct for understanding complex dynamic systems (see Figure 2) . NTMs provide an interesting terminology such as recursive processes and autological, self-referential, and second-order concepts (i.e., concepts that are embedded in their own domain).
As can be inferred from Figure 2 , the driving function y = F(x, s) is similar to the TM of Figure 1 . The state function s′ = S(x, s) is new and is recursive; that is, s′ is defined by s at an earlier stage. Suppose NTM is a discrete system. In that case, the state function can be represented by
S represents the memory or history of any NTM. The internal state generated through S influences the processing of subsequent inputs (x) to outputs (y). von Foerster (1984) has shown that identification of a large class of NTMs is impossible (transcomputational) because the machine's driving and state functions cannot be inferred from observed sequences of input/output pairs (x, y) from outside the black box. NTMs are characterized as synthetically deterministic (represented by deterministic driving and state functions), history dependent, analytically indeterminable, and analytically unpredictable. Suppose we arrange an experiment based on an NTM scheme and put researchers in the position of observers/experimenters. This will teach them that the simple notion of causality inferred from prior experiences with the TM no longer holds. Pending the internal state of the system, an outcome (response) y once observed for a given treatment (stimulus) x may not be the same for the same stimulus one time step later. Behavior of an NTM depends on its internal state, which depends recursively on the system's history.
This simple intervention in the internal structure of the black box changes the style of reasoning about causality drastically. It demonstrates the conceptual limitations of the textbook laboratory experiment, which conveys an image of a world made up of linear causal links between treatment and outcome variables. Investigating an NTM as if it were a TM is an example of flawed analysis within the analytical science domain.
A proper methodology for artifact assessment, as well as program evaluation, will take on board the ideas of the NTM and the following notions of complex adaptive systems (Klabbers, 2003a) .
Complex adaptive systems
In the study of social systems, groups and collective networks play a vital role. Group behavior is an emergent property. Groups, or human agents, produce social systems as historically located actors, under the conditions of their own choosing. Those actors have the following properties (Boxer & Cohen, 2000) :
• Composite-relying on the capabilities of other agents-they act on local knowledge; • Emergent-not being a mere static aggregate of those capabilities;
• Purposive-having their own goals and seeking to achieve them-they are action oriented; • Anticipatory-capable of choosing among possible actions on the basis of their own internal model (image, idea) of the world-based on limited information processing capacity; • Adaptive-capable of learning and thereby modifying both their organization and internal model with a view to improving its performance.
In complex adaptive systems, actors never possess a perfect model of their environment, which contains other actors that are regularly changing their positions, interests, and so on. They acquire information about it only through interacting with it, never having total information about its current state. They have limited resources, such as knowledge, memory, information, and funds. Therefore, they cannot hold a large group of potential models (images) of their environment, including models of For example, actors (stakeholders) take control of field experiments and of the implementation of artifacts in their operating environment. Their information needs and policy agendas define the context for addressing the question, What works? In terms of the inference scheme of the laboratory experiment, they define to a large extent the moderating context variables, which interact with the ongoing internal dynamics of the complex, multilevel, and open system involved. The context variables interconnect with the treatment variables. Pursuing, under such circumstances, textbook-style field experiments as if they were laboratory experiments-to assess artifacts and the real environment they are supposed to operate in-should be considered irrational from a scientific perspective. Building on the representation of the NTM, and taking on board the notions of complex adaptive systems, I have characterized social systems as follows (Klabbers, 1996; see Figure 3 ).
The state function s′ = S(s, x) is replaced by actors and rules, representing the internal state of the (multi)actor system. The reference system represents the function F, depicting the system's resources. This shift characterizes the switch from the machine to the actor approach. In the actor system, via communication and coordination, actors develop rules and procedures both for communicating and for intervening in their reference system. Through this recursive processing of information, they continuously enact a particular collective structure. The actors engage in a process of social construction of reality, and their collective awareness (the system of meaning) is an indicator of the internal state of the system. They engage in a recursive, time-variant process of change. They reproduce their social system in an operationally closed setting (Klabbers, 1986; Luhmann, 1986) . They shape a system of meaning and, as a consequence, "make history." Empirically assessing the usability of artifacts in their context of use should be based on grasping the interconnected and evolving processes, encompassing the actors, rules, and resources of the system involved.
Analytical and design science: Distinct concepts of causality
The analytical sciences favor the regularity conception of causality, derived from David Hume, elaborated and further developed by John Stuart Mill, Carl Hempel, and Ernest Nagel (Maxwell, 2004) . That conception is primarily interested in the question of whether x caused y, rather than how it did so. It refers to the notion of the TM (Klabbers, 1996; von Foerster, 1984; see above) . Mohr (1982) has related the regularity assumption, underlying this notion of causality, to "variance theory," which deals with variables and correlations among them. Scientific rigor is established through formulating precise statements of the underlying theory, generating well-specified hypotheses, and employing subsequently (quasi-) experimental designs, quantitative measurements, and statistical analysis for testing hypotheses. The resulting causal relations are defined by their invariance in space and time. This is the "gold standard" of the scientific method of the analytical science. Knowledge generated through this methodology is disembodied and decontextualized (Klabbers, 2004b) .
In contrast to the variable approach of the analytical sciences stands the process approach of design sciences, which needs a different mode of explanation, rooted in the comparative and observational richness of data and information from designers and users. Maxwell (2004) argues that process theory deals with events and processes that connect them. "It is based on an analysis of the causal processes by which some events influence others. It is fundamentally different from variance theory as a way of thinking about scientific explanation" (p. 5). I would argue that the differences lie in the position of the researcher. Following the variable approach, as a member of the community of observers, research is focused on establishing the x-y correspondence through F. Following the process approach, as a member of the community of practice, assessments involve designers and users and the way they construct meaning about the artifact in its context of use. The users are actors or agencies in public and private space. Process causality refers to linkages between actions and events and the way they unfold simultaneously and sequentially in time and space. These actions and events are designed into the utilization of artifacts. When driving a car from A to B during the night through a hilly region while it is raining heavily, the series of actions by the driver to steer the car, to get feedback about the grip of the wheels, to avoid collisions with animals crossing the road, and so on demonstrates process causality at work. It is an embodied experience.
The process approach enables observing causality through evaluation studies of artifacts, operating in unique circumstances-as single cases or unique events. It
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allows for the study of temporal and spatial chains of events and for looping effects. Meanings, beliefs, and intentions held by users of the artifacts are essential parts of the causal mechanisms operating in their use. They are causes that help understand and explain human action in relation to the artifact. Utilization of artifacts is contextdependent and embodied. Actors interact with the artifact or, as in games, are embedded in the artifacts, and they generate a dynamic actor-artifact system. Practices, which emerge from using artifacts, the rules, and roles, influence their meaning to the users. Causes are not restricted to physical entities. They include mental states as well. The relationship between causal mechanisms, embedded in the use of artifacts, and their effects is not fixed but contingent and emergent. They depend on the context within which the artifact operates. Using the scientific method, derived from the analytical sciences, and applying its special causal explanation to assessing artifacts, would fail to incorporate the interpretive character of our understanding of human thought and action vis-à-vis the artifact. Therefore, it needs to be abandoned as a viable approach to design science, especially with regard to the interplay between DIS and DIL.
Blurred evaluation methodology
Although numerous evaluation studies on gaming have been performed, a comprehensive framework for evaluating simulation games is still missing. One of the main reasons is the ambiguity of the researchers' position vis-à-vis the analytical and design science. It makes quite a difference for an evaluation study whether researchers are explicit about their membership of either one of both communities. Numerous evaluation studies confuse methods that are adequate for the analytical science with the prevailing methodology of the design sciences. Many evaluation studies of simulation games-as artifacts-are implicitly based on the variable approach of causality-as pursued in the analytical sciences, while ignoring the process approach. They take methods from analytical science and apply them to the design science, without questioning the underlying methodological and epistemological assumptions. If they aim at developing and justifying theories, being the major objective in the analytical sciences, they should explicitly convey it to the reader. In addition, they should be clear about the theory they want to test. If, on the other hand, they aim at building artifacts to change existing situations into preferred ones, they should make that clear as well. For justification and evaluation studies, they should use the appropriate methodology and be very cautious about using analytical research methods as inadequate crossovers.
Most games-artifacts-can be used to test in parallel various domain-specific theories such as educational theories, individual and social cognition theories, group dynamics, decision-making theories, and so on. Each specific theory will enlighten certain characteristics of the game-artifact, while ignoring other ones.
Evaluating games (and simulations) from the viewpoint of an analytical scientist is distinct from assessing games (artifacts) from the position of a design scientist. Design Framework for linking the analytical science and design science
To be able to grasp the wide variety of games and simulations and their methodological foundations, the following dimensions of scientific research need to be taken into account (see Figure 4 ):
• the dimension that runs from monodisciplinary to metadisciplinary research, with, as intermediate phases, cross-disciplinary, multidisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and interdisciplinary approaches; • the dimension that links the analytical with the design sciences through the communities of observers and practice.
To understand the differences and communalities between the analytical and the design sciences, we need to be aware of the way we construct abstract objects by science. Therefore, we need to face two existential questions: What is it that we create, and how much is fully determined in ways that are totally independent of ourselves? The communities of analytical and design scientists tend to answer these questions differently.
In the field of simulation and gaming, representatives of both communities meet each other. Often, this causes confusion, misunderstanding, and sometimes frustration. One of the reasons is that progress and criteria of success are defined so differently. As long as both communities are not aware of their different epistemologies, methodologies, and crafts, they run the risk of judging each other on wrong terms, using criteria of success that apply to their particular domain, which may be incompatible with the criteria of the other community. Such a situation is hampering a fruitful exchange of ideas. Moreover, members of both communities may not understand how they can benefit from one another.
Members of both communities are well aware of the many efforts it takes to successfully accomplish a simulation gaming project. Once the artifact has been designed, it may be used to enhance changing existing situations into preferred ones. However, there is also another option. The artifact generates qualities and outcomes that can be studied by the communities of observers in a similar way as natural objects are studied. The emerging field of agent-based modeling is a clear example of using artifacts to test theories about economic behavior, while applying the laboratory style of reasoning, and taking the position of an outside observer.
Both communities of observers and practice deal with games and simulations in different ways. Especially, the communities of observers from the social and behavioral Klabbers / ARTIFACT ASSESSMENT AND THEORY TESTING 169 sciences will have to check carefully their theories of knowledge. They tend to approach human and social objects as if they are indifferent to their classifications, in similar ways as atoms are studied. They should be aware of the self-referential qualities of the classifications used. I will not elaborate on it in the context of this article, and refer to Klabbers (2003a) for more details.
The communities of observers, while obeying the rules of their paradigms, mainly pay attention to reconstructing the past; the communities of practice engage in shaping futures. They may use knowledge from the analytical science as input into their practice as long as it contributes to building the artifacts. If they do so, they need to translate context-independent concepts into local circumstances. Building artifacts is, however, a science, an art, and a craft. It is not fully understood. Gaming, as a particular branch in the design sciences, concerns embodied artifacts, embodied in their forms and in their utilization. The analytical sciences are focused on disembodied objects, dealing primarily with the conceptual. The following line of reasoning makes clear the link between analytical and design science activities: When an artifact and its performance have been evaluated, it is imperative to trace the why and how the artifact did or didn't work in its environment. By doing this kind of research, the activities from analytical sciences are applied, in the sense that "we theorize and then justify theories about those artifacts" (March & Smith, 1995) . If, by pursuing such an approach, we may ignore the different types of causality that are at stake, then as a consequence, we may run into serious trouble.
Especially from computer-based games, we have become aware that information technology (IT) has modified our knowledge frames. Rizzi (2004) points out that experience with IT has revealed that the will to explain or rebuild the world through a formal and rational methodology, by means of an explicit theory formulated in precise terms, has not been realized to its full extent. The theory about such artifacts is not able to follow the rapid and whirling developments of technology, which "in order to enter the market and our houses, . . . does not wait for science and its licences of legitimacy" (Longo, 2001 , cited in Rizzi, 2004 . Rizzi continues that it is possible to observe how users of artifacts are more interested in "how to use them" than in trying to understand "how they work." She refers to Kelly (1999) , who distinguishes two attributes that convey a trend in technology: net and incompleteness. These terms relate to postnormal science and complexity science, as presented above (Kelly, 1999 , cited in Rizzi, 2004 ).
The atom is the icon of the 20th century. The atom whirls alone. It is the metaphor for individuality. But the atom is past. The symbol for the next century is the net. The net has no center, no orbits, no certainty. It is an indefinite web of causes. The net is the archetype displayed to represent all circuits. . . . Whereas the atom represents clean simplicity, the net channels messy complexity. (p. 61) Similar to postnormal science and complexity science, this characteristic of the net relates to incompleteness, and emergence of coevolving systems.
Summary remarks: Formal, explanatory, and applied sciences
Three terms need further attention within the frame of reference of Figure 4 : formal, explanatory, and applied sciences. Blasi and Alfonso (2006 [this issue ]) refer to van Aken (2004) , who has made the distinction between the formal sciences "building systems of propositions whose main test is their internal logical consistency" and the explanatory sciences "seeking to describe, explain and possibly predict observable phenomena" within a specific field. Kriz and Hense (2006 [this issue] ) refer to applied science.
The formal sciences deal with abstract objects and their formal, mathematical relations. These abstract systems such as algebra, geometry, and so on provide a precise and accurate way to develop internally consistent languages for expressing theories. They form the basis for the explanatory sciences, such as in physics, chemistry, and so on. Both are fully embedded in the analytical sciences, in the communities of observers. In the design sciences, the formal sciences have an additional role to play. The rationality, based on instrumental reasoning. Their limited scope does little justice to the social construction of knowledge outside the realm of laboratory research. Applied sciences are extensions of laboratory research. Design sciences require an epistemology and methodology, which is distinct from the applied sciences. They deal with the interplay between DIS and DIL (Klabbers, 2003b) . Under the systems approach, I view problems in research design as methodological decisions to be determined essentially by the broad purpose of the inquiry. Depending on whether the purpose of research is that of the analytical or design sciences, decisions will differ with respect to the choice and formulation of a problem, use of models and hypotheses, kinds of criteria, methods of generalization, and kinds of emergent action (see also Finan, 1966, p. 526) .
